jj3 — Bellazon

Grossly Incandescent

Posts: 42604

#561

2 hours ago, F 4 5 H U N said:

@Cult Icon what's your source?

For what exactly? For France 1940: Mainly war diaries Bock, Halder and Freiser's "Blitzkreig Legend", Doughety's books, Fall Geib I/II (Dildy) , Armored Bears: 3.Panzer, Panzerkorps GD- Volume I, and myself.

Grossly Incandescent

Posts: 42604

#562

13 hours ago, jj3 said:

I would describe the "Roman National" like the way we see our own History...We put the highlight on the some episods, and choos to "forgot" some others ...I guess every countries do that...

Yes, i agree with what you said about metodical battle. But once again, to practice it, we must be two or more. I don't quite see we will see that during our personal life time.

Francs-tireurs or as we call it now "guerrilla" is for me still the futur of the war during the 21th century...

Yea, pretty much- filtering by omission is the norm in the US as well.

In the Halder war diary, the top management was intensely focused on taking out France as soon as Poland was taken. The diary entries are mostly about military development and training efforts to get ready.

Niffler!!!

Posts: 41187

#563

On 12/12/2015 at 10:50 AM, jj3 said:

You talk about the chips ?

NOPE!

F

F 4 5 H U N

Posts: 1532

#564

Thanks @jj3 and @Cult Icon

Grossly Incandescent

Posts: 42604

#565

Another big aspect:

-Both the British and the French were deficient in training, command & control- the reaction times of their formations were far too slow to react to changing events and they had problems massing units at decisive points. This was the same problem the soviets had. In training the biggest issue was not say- length or experience but skills that were developed. They prepared for the invasion doing tasks that did not adequately prepare themselves for the future. It was a great waste due to faulty doctrine.

-A major British issue was in the area of infantry assault and infiltration- which were problems that existed well into 1944. They had shortcomings in training infantry.

-The Doughty books (Seed of Diaster, Breaking Point) and Frieser emphasize the superior german doctrine and preparation but also emphasizes that it was the ability of the germany to train huge numbers of tough, well trained infantry with innovative methods that was just as important as the armor & airpower. Eg. A the Sedan, it took the infiltration of a single company, platoon, and a section of elite infantry (1.Pz, GD) to dislodge the French 55.FI.

-Differing reactions: Like the Soviets in 1941, the British and French were trashed by the Germans on the broad front but their reactions had one major difference- the Soviets were more prone to react to the Axis with suicidal 'do or die' counterattacks that neverless chipped away at axis strengths and supply. Like the soviets, the Germans also had a counterattack policy, but theirs were more nuanced and efficient. The British and the French were not so ruthless and would just retreat or surrender. This lead to a terrible situation where the germans advanced while compressing 1.7 million allied soldiers in the Northern front while themselves having only low losses and plentiful supplies/ammo. 1.2 million french soldiers were captured. BEF prisoners added to this figure. After this was done, the weaker half of the French Army (in the South )was quickly eliminated in June. The chief lesson here is the importance of immediate counterattacks to deplete enemy momentum.

- The war was effectively won in a few days after the breakthrough of the Sedan and the isolation of half of the French Army and also the BEF. Fall Gelb cost the Germans only around the equivalent of 5% of their infantry strength. Fall Gelb saw only 19,000 dead germans (Fall Rot, the elimination of the other half of the French Army- saw 30,000 dead). Total casualties: ~160,000 . By June 1, 1940, 70% of german armor remained operational- the german ground force was not seriously taxed.