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Who/what are you referring to (end of history)? One thing you should know about me is that I have a skeptical approach to social science. I enjoying reading it and it provides ideas. But it's just that with extremely theoretical things that are not proven rigorously... I am always very skeptical (such as sociology, cultural commentary and political science). This is why you see me kind of shy away from talking about certain types of generalizations.
The type of history I (and we- military history community) prefer is the type that is close enough to the archives to allow the reader to apply their knowledge/ability to form an interpretation. In the US Army, this method of communication is taught. It's the 'facts' only, with hopefully minimal filter/opinion. The analysis can come at the end, though. Books like this have enduring value. However, it is important for a good historian to select what is valuable and discard what is just "noise". The type of military history book I dislike is the type that is filled with opinion and anecdotes (trying to prove this or that) & structured like a rhetorical/polemical text. And with minimal/primitive maps.
If I re-read, for instance, Glantz' "From Don the Dnepr: Soviet offensive operations 1942/1943" or "Barbarossa Derailed", I am certain that I will visualize the battlefield differently(better) than I did when I read it two years prior. To a layman, it's a mass of technicalities (troop movements, data, indicators, etc.) and is unreadable. Of course, when one develops the ability to read it, the battlefield comes alive. This is what the good stuff should be like.
Yes, i get this tendance also that History is now view and treated like a romance...Some are even saying that History is over, and some are intellectuals...History will be over the day where the last man will die lol
To be honest, i like statistics, and true facts, we can learn lots of truth in studying statistics, but i'm more into interpretation. In France we that Le Roman National ( The National Romance), we try to give a sense and a logical to our past, it's good when it's matter to to give to the younger of us an easy way to start to learn History, but then, it's start to a probleme when some people are trying to use History for their own interests, which is always more the case now i find.
History is a science, and need a good level of rigor, and honesty with the facts too.
But i get to that countries can have a differente point of view in some episods of the History, especially when it's recent History.
And the WW2 is still that.
We can be sure of only one thing about the WW2, the next big war won't be the same, the one, the faction, who will not get that at the first minutes of the war will lose for sure.
Only a fool would not study history and learn from the [relevant] mistakes of the past or get ideas for the future. It's true that history can be used/manipulated for purposes of today. That is why I totally reject nationalism and patriotic ideologies. I am a taxpayer and a citizen; I am part of social contract. That is all.
I actually don't have much fear of nuclear war. From an American's perspective, it is possible that my country will invade another small, oil producing country in the coming decades. My country will make many mistakes. The first mistake, and most obvious one is that our military manpower will be far too small for the mission at hand and our body politic will sell the war to the masses using "have your cake and eat it too" arguments. There will be a fetishism of technology to replace manpower. The war will drag on for a long time, be forgotten by most, and then eventually my country will leave in defeat.
The great insights of Barbarossa and the Soviet offensive operations 43-45 is how to best conquer continents against powerful opponents and what total war entails. They are massive, real world case studies. The Russians/Soviets see this as a valuable reservoir of human/organizational experience. I believe they are correct.
Well, no specific referencies, in Europe it's particulary palpable here, there's this tendency to all the time talk about the fall of the Roman Empire, with all the fear that it can contains...See all these theories about the end of the world (Apocalypse)... I think we could find a certain logicalty to these phenomenons. After the Attacks over the US in 2011 we heard a lot of things like "oh well the History is still alive", like if no wars meant that the History stoped his march...
I'm very skeptical too, but being too much that drive some people to believe in some idiotics conspiracy theories ... And imo, a good historian must stay out of this. Facts and only the facts.
For the rest i agree with you !
Soviets strategy during the whole WW2 operations was extremely costly in human life, and human life can be counted as a simple material, and that's what Soviets did.
This war was in his style a shock of civilizations too.
Well, the American perspective and prospective is motived by the last wars and operations that US Army had to conduct...and they are only almost defeats or failure...Korea, Vietnam, Operations in Iran, Afghanistan, Irak, Somalia...
So, the tendency to replace human hand by technology is comprehensible at the light of the recent past, and experiences. But i don't think it will resolve the problems...we see the results today of the air strikes over "daesh", the resut is no result...
The basic prerequisite to winning wars is 1. enough people on the ground 2. and more obviously, these are motivated, TALENTED people, who have skills and creative solutions to problems. Technology/material quantity matters, but it's part of a value-added system. Until human beings can be replaced with intelligent robots we are stuck with soldiers being the only ones that can take and hold ground or try to "influence hearts and minds". In an asymmetrical war like Iraq, it was the brainpower, motivation, and numbers of boots that mattered the most. The US had none of these. Without these, resources are wasted.
The idea that technology can replace talented people is a marketing gimmick by British and American politicians & military leaders- these beliefs were present in WW2 as well. If wars are fought, they are fought with sufficient human talent and material resources or should never be fought in the first place.
Soviet operational art cannot be simplified into "mass". They were a reflection both of communist thinking and also their own economic constraints (command style economy) and economic output (less than Germany's in fact..). A large, multi-national population base, but mostly not well educated or a sizable portion not speaking the same tongue. The war machine they created, and evolved into different forms were based on their own circumstances. That a 3rd world developing country with an industrial core was able to create a war machine that could generate more offensive power than the Allies in the West front 44' is something very interesting to see. They used less material ( but more manpower) and generated far more combat power.
The Soviet generals by late 43/45 were far more experienced than the US/British generals in armored operations and ground combat. A general like Vatutin or Rokossovsky had years of war experience in extreme combat. This showed in the execution of operations. They were sublimely clever and fighting them resembled a game of chess- Vatutin was one of the greatest generals of the war. They were adept at encircling and penetrating the operational rear.
The Soviet way of war is not without defects, of course. The most obvious is the high casualties. However, their logistics and generalship were very sound in 44/45. The high losses could have been adverted with expensive, time consuming troop training programs and tactical material such as armored personnel carriers and armored recon vehicles. But the Soviets were not fighting a "rich man's war". They had to concentrate on the most important things while neglecting the ones they could get away with. The soviet tank armies in 44/45 were in fact well-trained and highly experienced. Much more so than the other elements of their army.
A politically incorrect statement is that the US/UK ground forces under-performed their technical/material resources in WW2- they spend so much engineering, firepower, and production but the results were not that high. They remained mediocre in the human area.
What is often not considered is the fact that the German army in the East was far more powerful than that in Normandy throughout the war. The Germans shifted reserves laterally all the time. The Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive of Dec 24, 1943-Jan 14, 1944 was against a concentration of german forces more powerful than that of normandy 44'.
I agree with you ! But overal, this is the idea of a professional army who need to be improved...Since the Spartan "Army" to British Army of the 18th century, some people think that is the ultimate model for an army, but this can become a probleme when we're talking about the motivation of the soldiers...
I agree to say also that the west front for the German was the less imortant front too. And we could tak about the mental factor too, there's a difference to fight against the US/UK armies than against the Soviets one...
^^
I meant in terms of the "job at hand". A different army for a different job. It takes years for an army to develop the skills for certain types of war (and ditto for the truism of many armies being "designed" for the last war). The Wehrmacht was a product of the defeat of the german army in WW1 and a desire to find a way out of the cycle of attrition. So they created an unusual military. The Red Army of fall 1943 was very different from the one of summer 1941. The US Army was based around overseas power projection and political constraints. So a war in the middle east should require something that is tailored towards winning there as well- the variety of skills needed to win there. Don't ask me what they are! I'm not specialist here. But no war can be won with such small numbers of people trying to occupy a nation that is culturally far detached from theirs.
Yes, the east front was completely vicious. Outside of encirclements with organized pow bags (small, medium, large), a lot of day to day combat actions are like this for say, a corps or a division: 480 estimated dead, 324 counted dead, 79 prisoners.
Do you play to some video games on PC or else about WW2 ?
No, I don't. Though in the past I have enjoyed playing some COH, COH2, RO2.
I was thinking to COH when i asked you this question ! 
I played only to the 1rst one, but it was so damn fun !
Yea! COH is fun. I never played it online though- I only discovered it a few years ago.
And what is your opinion about Zhukov or Konev ? Americans or Germans had tons of Generals or Generalfeldmarschall, but it seems that Joukov and Konev was alone during the operations ...with Timoshenko too.
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Since I'm totally focused on ground combat (I'm not a logistics, navy or air force focused person) I tend to focus most heavily on studying the armor and infantry generals. I have a fetish for outstanding military performance (haha).
Oh, there were many soviet generals. What you are mentioning are the Front commanders (eg. in Western parlance, that's an army commander. Zhukov was more like an army group commander). These guys are more "HQ" type of commanders, not so much "front line".
Zhukov was a STAVKA representative/coordinator. He represented the Soviet elite to coordinate various Fronts in operations. Timoshenko was part of Stalin's old Calvary clique. Timoshenko was a front commander until his failures (most obviously spring 1942, 2nd Kharkov) got him kicked to a ceremonial post. He eventually became a front commander again in 1944. Konev was an army commander that distinguished himself in 1941 until he was almost arrested during Typhoon (commanded Kalinin Front 1941). He eventually distinguished himself
Zhukov to me was incredibly brutal to his men. I would say that he was not a great top level strategist. He was not terrible either- just competent. He got things done and he was the ruthless leader the Soviet Union needed to survive against Barbarossa. The reason why I say this is the type of fighting that occurred in Barbarossa- It is difficult to see anybody but the soviet union surviving against it. They used very horrific methods to survive- and survive they did with millions of casualties. I would say that his best operation was the Vistula-Oder offensive. He brought too many Barbarossa habits to the late war- and it cost blood.
Timoshenko was either average or poor. He owed his presence due to his role in the Russian civil war. He had some big failures and some "average" performance.
Konev was very solidly competent- an above-average commander but with failures, too. But no great operational genius.
There were about half a dozen Front commanders that fought throughout the war (like Malinovsky and Vatutin) and also countless Red Army generals. A Red Army "Army" is actually only like a western corps. My personal favorite Front commander is Vatutin.
The most flashy and interesting of these Army generals were four out of six Tank Army guys: Tank Army (1,2,3,5) : Katukov, Bogdanov, Rybalko, and Rotmistrov. In my opinion, these were among the best generals of the war.
But in terms of tank and infantry generalship- the Germans on average had the best corps and division commanders of the war. They were much weaker, however, at higher levels (Army and Army Group) but they had a few great generals at this level.
What are your favorite generals of WW2?
Very intresting, thanks for the names ! 
I will have to read and inform myself about them.
Difficult question, De Gaulle maybe And it's not a joke 
Hard to answer Patton or Bradley are intersting, but there's McArthur too, in add of the military competence, i give a big importance to their political science too.
But as only a General, maybe as i said, Model (even if he was very defensive but it's an useful quality imo) or Guderian ...but there's von Manstein too...
And you ?
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This a book about six tank army generals (english). This was written by my longtime hobby friend, Colonel Armstrong.
I am very combat oriented so in terms of generalship I hesitate to include any American or British commanders. The combat record is way too short/little, and they went to battle with multiples of advantages. I consider them untested. Although units like the US 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions were very good and the US Army's tactical units were much more expensively supported than most others.
This is how I interpret ability:
"In final analysis, a review of how accurately losses are reported, or how professional errors are dealt with, or how commanders respond to their situations and make operational decisions, only serves to confirm that uncertainty and confusion are unavoidable elements in warfare.
It is how commanders overcome that uncertainty and confusion, how to respond to inaccurate and incomplete information while simultaneously maximizing and optimizing the use of the resources available to them, which is often taken as a measure of their professional competence."
Like the Colonel, we both believe that the test of great generalship requires great pressure and stress. A terrifying situation. So the "resource" thing is important to me. Creativity, Discovery, and Efficiency.
I am familiar with Model. He was a great general-he started the war in command of the elite 3.Panzer-Division, which culminated in the Kiev pocket and the spearhead for the drive for Moscow. As a tactical commander, he was like Rommel- his vehicles were shot out under him and he led from the front, inspiring the unit. His culminating moment as a commander was as commander of the 9th Army at Rzhev. In this sector, his men held out against overwhelming forces for many months, inflicting unbelievably high losses using excellent generalship and creative tactics. If he was an American, British, French, or a Soviet he would have become a cultural phenomenon but he was on the side of the 'bad guys' and died while burning his military records. He went from a division commander to Army Group during WW2.
***At the Top level/Army Group level, it's Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky. Vatutin was killed by Ukrainian nationalists in April 1944 but I believe that if he had lived,...he would have rose to become a Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Bock (Army Group commander) was also very good. Manstein IMHO was overrated as an AG commander. He was better when he was an Army general.
At the Army/Front level, it's Guderian, Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Manstein, Kleist, Model
At the Corps/Soviet Army level, it's Vatutin, Balck, Rybalko, Katukov, Hube, Chuikov, Rommel, Raus, Rokossovsky
To me, these were the men of great talent in that war.
Yes i can be only agree with your analysis and the one of your hobby friend, of course !
But, i'm not sure about Rommel though ...
I agree to say that Americans commanders were not enough tested, i always thought that, we'll never know...
Curious to see that we never mentioned once Japan army and commanders so far ...
Yea, with Japan I'm frankly not familiar with them enough. It's not my area (Mine is ETO 1944, Soviet Union 1941-1945). To me, Rommel was over-promoted- As a division/corps commander he was talented. Manstein is often cited as a great operational genius. I believe he was, but at the Army level. The Crimean campaign. His command of Army Group Don was really that of an Army. AG DON was only an Army group in name. When he actually became the commander of a real army group (the strongest Army group in the german army- AG South), he oversaw a string of defeats 43/44. The first was the disaster of Kursk, where his operational planning was based on a warped view of the Soviets. At the drama west of Kiev- a string of defeats- Oct 43-April 44 his performance cannot be in any way called great generalship or possessing great foresight.
It is difficult to evaluate American and British commanders- when they go into battle fighting a smaller scale sideshow (from the German perspective) like Italy, NA, or the 'lesser' front (NW Europe) with full and many multiples of resources per division & theater level. It becomes rather blurred. There was also no "Blitzkreig" or "Deep Battle" level operational performance by the Western allies or rapid collapse of the Germans in 1944 which hints much towards mediocrity. Then there is the reality that the German Army and Air force was a pale shadow of what it once was by 1944.
Yes the same for me. But it seems that Japanese was not that powerful that we could think, surely better than Italian, because the fanatism, but strategically and technically, they are not impressive ...
Agreed, and Operation Nordwind and Battle of the Bulge confirm what we think it seems too.
Have you watched Enemy at the Gates from Jean-Jacques Annaud ?
What are your favorites movies about WW2 ?
^
Most of the Japanese Army was trapped in the war against China and holding Manchuria. It's hard to tell. In the island battles, they had severe difficulties supplying their own troops, and the greater half of Japanese casualties were from illness or starvation. This made it a lot easier for US forces to destroy them. I think the Japanese infantry had great fighting spirit, though. It's hard to tell as like the Germans in 44', they were not fought against with anything approaching "fair" terms. It would take a continental battle between the US Army and the Japanese to tell. In the naval area it is obvious that they would be wiped out in a matter of time. Their war economy was weak, but I believe their infantry had the potential to punch above their weight. But they basically could not engage in motorized/armored warfare in a decent manner which would doom them against the major western powers in a continental struggle.
With the US I think the major detractor- (which is politically incorrect in the USA- apparently we have to be flawless because we won) was an over-reliance on material/methodical battle and an under-reliance on leadership initiative, leadership training, and maneuver warfare. The human area. US and British forces overinsured and tried to defeat the germans usually by applying firepower and mechanized weapons. This increased allied casualties and ensured the Germans could survive longer they should have. The political/alternate explanation is that the methodical material battle "decreases" losses but I believe this is a distortion of sorts. A major problem is that the breakthrough would be achieved but the allied forces were too timid to exploit it like the panzer divisions or soviet tank armies could. This lead to a gigantic, wasteful usage of supplies, many times that of the germans but with results that were mediocre. This ensured that Allied forces would have supply problems. There was no great operational maneuver or encirclement battle in normandy even though the tools to do so were there- the US and British armies were fully motorized and splendidly equipped.
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Yea, I saw Enemy at the Gates. Hmmph, I don't have a favorite war movie. There are decent ones but not any that I really like. I think band of brothers and the Pacific (miniseries) sets a good standard for how it should be done.
I like "Thin Red Line" and "Apocalypse Now" which is set in war, but aren't truly war movies (they are about the human condition).
What are your favorites?
It's interesting to read your words because you always seems quite fair on the topic you are talking about. Overal, i agree with your analysis.
I'm watching right now Enemy at the Gates, and i like it, movies where a soviets soldier is the main character are very so
I watched Band of Brothers too, and i really liked it as well, but the Pacific was lame IMO, not intersting at all, and quite messy i would like to say...
I like well the classic one like Where Eagles Dare or A Bridge Too Far...or Platoon too.
But my fave is Crimson Tide and also The Hunt for Red October is amazing !
You're talking to the right guy- I've studied a great deal about Stalingrad including all the most complicated books. I would say that Enemy of the Gates should be treated as a work of entertainment. Pretend that none of the "controversial" you saw in the film was real except some of the well made set pieces.
The Pacific is based on 3-4 classic American memoirs. I enjoyed the Pacific because I had studied this growing up, and had read Eugene Sledge's book.
A bridge too far is a good movie!
Stalingrad 1993 is the best Stalingrad movie to me. It has the best imagery However, it has many flaws in its characterization and I dislike the acting/story.
The english dubbing is very bad- maybe there is a german language one with french or english subtitles for you
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDR9FiSbguA
Brest Fortress was pretty good! Here are both, for free!
Another war movie I like is "Black Hawk Down".